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Administrative  trade barriers [ATBs] will play an increasing  role in trade protection  in the
future.  As non-administrative  trade barriers such as tariffs and  quotas decline,  the relative
importance of administrative trade barriers will increase.  As new World  Trade Organization
[WTO] rules' prohibit other forms of protection such as quotas  and tariff increases there will
be  some  propensity  for  governments  captured  by  interest  groups  to  resort  to  the  less
transparent ATBs.  Understanding the effects  of alternative  forms of ATBs  and how these
barriers  are  erected  within  the  existing  political  and  legal  system  should  become  an
increasingly  important aspect of international trade analysis.
End-use certificates  [EUCs]  are used to track commodities  from the farm gate until they
are transformed,  consumed,  or shipped out of a particular jurisdiction. Both Canada and the
United States  [US] use EUCs for wheat.  They  do so in  order to restrict benefits  accruing
from domestic agricultural programs to domestically produced grain, to protect the integrity
of the grading process, and to statistically track domestic and foreign wheat flows and their
use in each country. 2
Authorization for the use of EUCs is established through domestic law in each country
with the enactment of various pieces of primary and delegated  legislation (i.e.,  statutes and
regulations),  the specifics of which  are reviewed below. From an international perspective,
EUCs are quantitative restrictions  contrary to the basic notion of global free trade. However,
exceptions under the General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  [GATT]3, the Canada-United
States  Free  Trade  Agreement  [CUSTA]4,  and  later  the  North  American  Free  Trade
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161Agreement  [NAFTA] 5 permit their  use.  Thus  each  shipment  of Canadian  wheat  into  the
United States and of American wheat destined for processing to Canada must be accompanied
by an EUC.  The table below  sets out  annual flows of wheat  and  durum between  the two
countries in the last two crop years affected by EUC requirements.6
Table 1.  North American wheat flows,  1993-1995
1993/94  1994/95
M. Bushels  M. Tonnes  M. Bushels  M. Tonnes
From Canada to  Wheat  79.73  2.17  44.46  1.21
the US
Durum  16.90  .46  10.66  .29
Total  96.63  2.63  55.12  1.50
From the US to  Wheat  1.10  .03  .04  *
Canada
Durum  --  --  --  --
Total  1.10  .03  .04  .001
Source:  Canadian Grain Commission, Grain Statistics Weekly
* 662 Tonnes
In this paper we examine  ATBs created by the requirements  for EUCs for wheat imports
into Canada and the US.  On the surface these particular ATBs should have very little effect
on  trade.  There  is  little  economic  incentive  to  import  wheat  into  Canada  and  the  US
requirements should add only a small transaction cost for the import of Canadian wheat into
the US.  Thus  EUCs could be  seen as  a  gesture to  satisfy  local US political  demands to
restrict the imports of Canadian wheat.  A far less obvious effect is that this requirement has
allowed the Canadian Wheat Board [CWB] to effectively  maintain monopoly control over
shipments into the US milling wheat market by separating the feed and milling use markets
5(1993)  33 I.L.M. 289, Article 702(1)  and Annex  702.1.
6EUCs have been required for American imports of wheat to Canada since 1991  but EUCs
for Canadian wheat entering the US were not required before February 27,  1995.  See infra,
section 3.
162at the point of end-use.  Given this  separation of markets,  the US  scheme may be enhancing
Canadian producer revenue.  If this hypothesis is true, the EUCs may not create any more
than a token opposition from Canadian  officials.
The Canada-US Wheat Trade Disputes
For  many  years there  were  significant  trade  barriers  for the  trade of wheat  between
Canada and the US.  Canada protected  its domestic market with the use of import licenses
administered by CWB.  This protection  allowed the CWB  to operate  a "two  price wheat
policy"  where CWB domestic  sales were generally maintained  well above the world prices.
During this same period, the US had an import tariff of $0.21  per bushel ($8/t).  This tariff
virtually eliminated profitable arbitrage opportunities for the export of Canadian wheat to the
US.
The CUSTA, which came into effect in  1989, contained a formula to allow for removal
of the  Canadian  import  licenses  and the  US  import  tariff on  wheat.  As  a  result  of the
agreement coming into effect, the US has imported significant amounts of wheat and durum
from Canada.  As  shown  in  Figure  1 imports rose  steadily to  peak at  approximately  90
















































Figure 1.  US wheat imports from Canada.











1"'The shipments of wheat from Canada became  a major trade irritant to the US with legal
disputes  concerning  the  commodity  beginning  almost  immediately  after the CUSTA  was
implemented.  Since  1989, there were four significant legal challenges  attempting to restrict
Canadian wheat imports into the US.
First, starting in 1989, North Dakota durum wheat producers argued that Canadian freight
subsidies constituted an export subsidy, in violation of CUSTA Article 701.2.  Second, after
the US Trade Representative  determined that Canada had not violated this article (because
the freight subsidy under the Western Grains Transportation  Act applied to all shipments to
Thunder Bay, whether destined for export or domestic use), the US Congress instructed the
ITC  to  examine  the  "conditions  of competition"  between  the US  and  Canadian  durum
industries.  The ITC rejected the argument that the CWB had been "dumping"  durum into the
US (i.e.,  selling into the US below acquisition price).  The third legal challenge was the case
of Canadian  durum wheat sales heard before the bi-national panel in 1992 under Chapter  18
of the CUSTA.  The bi-national panel made its unanimous final ruling in early  1993', finding
there  was  no  compelling  evidence  that the CWB  was  selling below  its acquisition  cost.
Finally,  a fourth  case started in late October  1993,  when the critical vote on NAFTA was
before  the  US  House  of Representatives.  President  Clinton  wrote  formally  to  key
Congressmen  (who had tied their support for NAFTA  to the  wheat industry) pledging  to
investigate  and possibly  apply  a  Section  22 Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  [AAA]  action8
against  Canadian  wheat.  After  the  successful  NAFTA  vote  in  late  1993,  the  US
administration resisted initial pressure to make an emergency  Section 22 declaration  and tried
to ignore the issue altogether.  However, in January 1994, the US administration initiated  a
full International  Trade Commission [ITC] investigation under Section 22.  President  Clinton
directed the ITC to investigate whether wheat,  flour and  semolina imports
" ...  are being,  or are practically certain to be,  imported into the United  States
under  such  conditions  or  in  such  quantities  as  to  render  or  tend  to  render
ineffective,  or materially interfere with, the price support,  payment and production
adjustment program conducted by the Department of Agriculture for wheat .... "
In the ITC decision  there were three  separate  reports  to the President  each of which had
distinct  findings  and  recommendations.  In  one  report,  three  of the  six  commissioners
(including the Chair and Vice Chair) reported,  as a group, that they determined that there was
no  "material interference"  with the US wheat program  by imports.  These commissioners,
however, did provide the President with recommended  import restraints should he determine,
contrary  to  their  findings,  that  there  was  grounds  for  restricting  imports.  A  fourth
commissioner determined that there was sufficient evidence to find material interference, but
recommended  only a ten percent additional duty be applied after imports reached  500,000
7CUSTA Bi-national Panel Report, "The Interpretation  of and Canada's  Compliance with
Article  701.3  with Respect to Durum Wheat  Sales,"  CDA-92-1807-01  dated  8  February
1993.
8Title I 1-21,  48 Stat. 31.
164tons for durum and 800,000 tons for other wheat.  Such a policy would not likely have had
any  significant  impact  on  imports.  The  last  two  commissioners  also  found  material
interference and recommended relatively tight tariff rate quotas be applied.
Before the President  took any  action relative to the Section  22  of the AAA  case, the
wheat trade  dispute between  Canada and the US  came to a negotiated  resolution for the
1994/95 crop year.  At the end of July,  1994, the government of Canada agreed to limit wheat
exports to the US and the US agreed to drop its efforts  to secure an Article XXIII action
under the GATT to restrict wheat imports.  In an effort to find long term solutions, the two
states agreed that a bi-national commission of six to ten non government experts be appointed
to examine all aspects of Canadian and US marketing and support systems and on competition
in third markets for wheat.  The Commission filed an interim report in June  1995  but at the
time of this presentation  had yet to file its final report.
Under  the wheat  peace  agreement,  Canada was  allowed  to  export  300,000  tonnes  of
durum and 1,050,000  tonnes of "other wheat" from the CWB region to the US during the
Canadian 1994/95 crop year at the existing NAFTA tariff rates.  Shipments of durum between
300,000  and 450,000 tonnes were subject to $23 per tonne tariff.  Shipments  over 450,000
tonnes  of durum and  1,050,000 of other wheat were subject to a more prohibitive  $50 per
tonne  tariff  Shipments  of soft  winter  wheat  from  Ontario  and  shipments  of flour  and
semolina were exempt from any quantitative restrictions or additional tariffs.
The agreement lasted for 12 months ending in September  1995. No new agreement  has
been put in its place. During the one year agreement,  Canada exported  295,000 tonnes  of
durum and 950,000 tonnes of other wheat but many speculate that these restraints had little
influence on Canada - US trade.
On April  15,  1994, the US  and Canadian governments  signed the new WTO/GATT
Agreement.  Thus,  as  of January  1995,  both  states  agreed  to  new  tariff schedules  for
agriculture.  Perhaps more significantly  for the Canada-US  wheat trade, the US gave up its
AAA Section 22 rights and any existing quotas initiated under that Act,  all of which had been
grandfathered under previous GATT agreements.
The Legal Basis  for End-Use  Certificates in Canada and the US
Citizens on both sides of the US-Canada border have several reasons to be interested in
obtaining the other's wheat for specific purposes. These include re-exportation  or in-transit
storage and shipping to a third state, importation for direct animal consumption, importation
of seed  stocks for domestic use, or importation for milling, manufacturing,  brewing, distilling
or other forms of processing.
165Since the GATT  1947 and its coming into force in 1948, international trading rules have
generally prohibited the use of quantitative restrictions on the import or export of goods.9  The
GATT  1947,  however,  provided for  myriad  exceptions  to  this general  rule,  including for
example,  exceptions which permitted quantitative restrictions to implement grading systems 0
or to otherwise protect the operation of domestic farm programs.1
Taking advantage of GATT exceptions, Canadian legislation makes it generally illegal for
anyone  to  import  wheat  into  Canada.  The  "grain  trade  matrix"  of Canadian  federal
legislation' 2 does however,  in very limited circumstances,  permit imports. Prior to 1989, the
importer of foreign wheat was required to obtain an import permit or license  for a fee, the
granting of which was at the discretion  of the CWB.
As  part  of the  Canada-US  Free  Trade  negotiations  in  the  1980s,  Canada  agreed  to
eliminate  any import  permit  requirements  for American  wheat coming  into Canada  when
levels of support for wheat became  equal to or less than the level of government support for
wheat in Canada.13 If and when import permit requirements were lifted, Canada reserved the
right  instead  to  require  EUCs  for  American  wheat  imports  destined  for  processing  in
Canada. 14
The Legal Basis in Canada
In  1991,  Canada  discontinued the requirement  of import  permits for American wheat
coming  into  Canada.  Instead,  it  instituted  a legal regime  that  had been  agreed  to  under
CUSTA Article 705(1).  Since that time American wheat destined for processing in Canada
9GATT, Article XI.
"oArticle XI(2)(b).
"Article  XI(2)(c).  Other  non-conforming  GATT  measures  protecting  the  operation  of
domestic farm program were either grandfathered by the Protocol of Provisional Application
that brought the GATT  1947 into force, or legitimized by waivers from GATT obligations
permitted under Article XXV of the GATT.
12The Canadian Wheat Board Act, R.S.C.  1985, c. C-24; The Canada Grain Act R.S.C.  1985,
c. G-10; The Seeds Act R.S.C.  1985, c. S-8; The Customs Act R.S.C.  1985, c. C-52.6; and
regulations made pursuant to these Acts.
1 3CUSTA, Article 705 and incorporated into the NAFTA by NAFTA Article 702 and Annex
702.1.
14CUSTA,  Article  705(1)(a).  Subparagraph  (b)  further permitted  Canada to  require  that
imports destined for livestock feed be denatured and in subparagraph  c) that seed stock be
accompanied by a seed certificate issued by Agriculture Canada.
166must be accompanied  by an EUC. 1 5
At  a domestic level, the EUC permits otherwise illegal imports of American grain into
Canada.  The Canadian Wheat Board Act has been amended to allow the Federal  cabinet to
make regulations permitting
...the importation into Canada of wheat or wheat products that are entitled to the
benefit of the United States Tariff of Schedule I to the Customs Tariff and that are
owned by a person other than the [Canadian Wheat] Board... [provided]...  that the
wheat be accompanied by an end-use  certificate referred to in subsection 87.1(1)
of the Canada  Grain Act, completed by the person importing the wheat,  declaring
that the wheat is imported for consumption in Canada  and is consigned directly to
a  milling,  manufacturing,  brewing,  distilling  or  other  processing  facility  for
consumption at that facility....16
Section  15.1 of the Canadian Wheat Board Regulations 17, enacted by the Federal cabinet  in
1991, thus formally permits any person to import American wheat for processing into Canada
provided they obtain,  complete and distribute an EUC to the proper authorities.
The form of the EUC that must be used is set out in the regulations  to the Canada Grain
Act  as Form  1 of Schedule  XV. 1 8  Canadian  processors  importing American  wheat  must
request the EUC from the Canadian  Grain Commission. The Canadian  Grain Commission
must make EUCs easily available and at no charge.  An EUC is required for each shipment of
American wheat into Canada.  The EUC must be completed in triplicate  and accompany the
shipped  commodity when it crosses into Canada.  When the shipment  arrives at the border,
"American  wheat imported for direct animal consumption requires no EUC or import licence
but must be denatured by red dye (CWB Reg.  15.1(b)).  Since August 1995,  American wheat
imported and then re-exported  requires  in bond treatment  under the Customs  Act. Before
1995, the CWB  required (CWB  Reg.  14)  in-transit import/export  licences.  American wheat
imported into Canada as seed must be accompanied by a certificate  issued pursuant to section
4.1 of the Seeds Act.  (CWB reg.  15.1(c)).
Since  1995 import licence requirements  have been eliminated on imports of wheat from
foreign  states.  Instead,  wheat  originating  from non-NAFTA  countries  for any purpose  is
subject to the tariffication rules of the WTO/GATT.  Imports of wheat and durum to Canada
are subject to a tariff of4.4 percent up to  a volume of 136,130 tonnes, or 3 percent of 1986-
88 domestic consumption.  Imports over this volume will be assessed an over-quota  tariff of
57.7 percent for durum and 90 percent for other wheat. See H. Brooks and D. Kraft, "The
Uruguay  Round  agreement  and  the  Canadian  grains  and  oilseeds  industry"  in  World
Agriculture  in  a  Post-GATT  Environment:  New  Rules,  New  Strategies  (Saskatoon:
University Extension Press,  1995) at pp. 205-206.
1 6Canadian Wheat Board Act, s. 46(b. 1).
78OR/91-302,  s.  15.1,  1991 Canada Gazette Part II, p.  1649.
1 8Canada Grain Regulations,  SOR/93-24,  1993,  Canada Gazette Part II, p.213.
167the Canada Grain Act19 requires that the EUC be presented to the Customs officer, who keeps
one copy to remit to the Canada Grain Commission. The remaining two copies of the EUC
remain with the shipper/importer and the consignee or final processor.
To  continue  the tracing  of the American  wheat,  the importer  and  the processor  are
required  to  prove  through  supplementary  documentation  filed  with  the  Canadian  Grain
Commission that the American wheat has not been diverted from the stated use or facility.
The importer must, within 10 days after the delivery of the grain to the processor, provide the
Canadian Grain  Commission with a copy of the bill  of lading  on which the processor  has
acknowledged  receipt of the grain covered by the EUC.20 The processor must, every three
months after the receipt of American wheat described in an EUC, report21 whether the wheat
which is the subject of the EUC,  has been fully consumed  and if not, how long before it will
be used.  This reporting requirement  continues until the processor can report that all of the
wheat  under  the  EUC  has  been  consumed.22  Thus  all  wheat  imported  by  one  Canadian
processor  must  be used  by  that  processor  and  cannot  be otherwise  traded  or  sold.23  A
schematic of the Canadian EUC process is shown in Appendix  1  a.
Penalties for non-compliance with the EUC obligations are set out in the Canada Grain
Act24  and are of two types.  There is a general penalty provision contained in section  107(2)
which  states that anyone contravening  a provision of the Canada Grain Act,  including  the
provisions for failing to obtain or fraudulently completing  an EUC, is guilty of an offence  and
liable:
a)  if an individual,  on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $2,000  or one year
imprisonment or both; or, by indictment,  to a fine not exceeding $4,000 or two years
imprisonment  or both;
b)  if a  corporation,  on  summary  conviction  to  a  fine not  exceeding  $3,000;  or, by
indictment,  to a fine not exceeding  $6,000.
A second penalty provision specific to the use of EUCs is also provided in section  105.1  and
107(1.1) of the Act. These sections create a special penalty for the unauthorized re-direction
of grain covered by an EUC.  Section  105.1  states that a person cannot knowingly use grain
imported  into  Canada  under  an EUC  for  any use  other than  consumption  at the  facility
referred to in the EUC. If a person does so, that person is liable:
1 9Section 87.1(2).
20Canadian Grain Regulations, SOR/93-197, s.87(3).
21End-Use Certification Consignee Quarterly Report.
22Canada Grain Regulations,  SOR/93-197,  s.87(4).
2Section  105.1 of the Canada Grain Regulations prohibits anyone from using grain imported
under a EUC from being consumed in any facility other than the one indicated  in the EUC.
24Canada Grain Act, as amended by S.C. 1988,  c.65, ss.  102-110.
168a)  if an individual,  on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding  $9,000 or two years
imprisonment  or both; or,  by indictment,  to a fine at the discretion of the court, or
four years imprisonment  or both;
b)  if a corporation,  on summary conviction to a fine of $30,000;  or, by indictment, to a
fine at the discretion of the court.
To date there have been no prosecutions under either of the penalty provisions.
The Legal Basis in The US
Effective February 27,  1995,  all Canadian wheat entering the US for whatever purpose
required an EUC.  The Consolidated Farm Service Agency  of the United  States Department
of Agriculture  [USDA]  is  responsible  for the  administration  of its  EUC  program.  The
program,  as in Canada, only applies to wheat. American legislation mandating the use of end-
use certificates,  Section 321(f) of the North American Free Trade Implementation  Act,25 only
requires the use of EUCs on commodities when Canada requires them of American products.
Pursuant  to  section  321(f)(4),  the  Secretary  of Agriculture  must  suspend  the  EUC
requirement  beginning  30  days after  suspension  of the EUC  requirement by  the Canadian
government for American wheat.
Section  321(f)  provides  that  the  process  for  obtaining  EUCs  be  set  out  in  the
regulations.26 These regulations set out two forms which must be completed by importers,
subsequent buyers, end-users or re-exporters of Canadian wheat.  Form ASCS-750, "End-Use
Certificate for Wheat,"27 must be completed by all importers of Canadian wheat into the US.
This  form  starts  the  tracing  process.  The  form  must  be  submitted  to  the  Kansas  City
Commodity Office within  10 working days28 from the date that the Canadian wheat enters the
US.  On the form,  importers must state the quantity  and type of the wheat imported.  The
wheat covered by an EUC must not be commingled  or blended with US wheat until such time
as the Canadian wheat is either delivered to an end-user or loaded on a conveyance  for direct
delivery to an end-user.
When  the importer is  not the end-user  and  must sell  to a  subsequent  buyer or to the
ultimate end-user, the importer must report the sale, within  10 working days29, on a second
25Public Law  103-182 [H.R. 3450]; December 8,1993  - Title III - 107  Stat. 2111-2112.
267 CFR Part 782.
27Under proposed  changes to the Regulations,  this form will be renumbered to CFSA-750.
For proposed  changes to Regulations  under 7 CFR Part 782,  see Quick Federal Register
(text) 60 FR 57219, 3 November  1995.
28Under proposed changes to the Regulations,  this reporting period will be lengthen to 15
days. For proposed  changes,  see  supra,  note  31.  Furthermore,  reporting  under the  new
Regulations would be permitted by mail, fax or electronic transmission.
29Under proposed changes to the Regulations,  this reporting period will be lengthen to 15
days as well. For proposed changes,  see supra, note 31.
169form ASCS-751,  "Wheat Consumption and Resale Report," 30 as well  as providing the buyer
or the end-user with a copy of the ASCS-750 EUC covering the sale quantity. This must be
done  for  each  individual  sale  of wheat.  When  the end-user  finally  obtains  ownership  of
Canadian wheat subject to an EUC, it must report its holdings in an ASCS-751  and continue
to do so quarterly until the wheat is fully consumed.  As well, any subsequent  buyer must state
the end-use of the Canadian wheat.3 1
The  American  legislation  appears  to makes  no  distinction  between  Canadian  wheat
imported for seed,  livestock use, processing or re-export. All uses require completion of an
ASCS-750  EUC. However, the American legislation  does seem to permit a reallocation  of
wheat from,  say processing to re-export,  if the importer or subsequent  buyer so wishes. All
that any re-exporter of Canadian wheat is required to do is to complete an ASCS-751  when
the grain  is exported  and to undertake  not to commingle  Canadian wheat with American
wheat until the wheat  is loaded onto a conveyance for delivery to a foreign country. In this
way the tracing is complete.  A schematic of the US EUC process is shown in Appendix  lb.
Penalties for non-compliance  fall under section 782.19 of the regulations which states that
it shall be a violation of 18 USC s. 1001  for any entity to engage in fraud with respect to, or
to knowingly violate the provisions [of the regulations].  18 USC  s. 1001  is a general  penal
provision  employable  where persons make false  statements  or  conceal  information  when
required  to  report  information to the  government  of the US.  Penalties  include  fines  to  a
maximum of $10,000  or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both.
EUCs as Trade-Distorting  Non-Tariff  Barriers?
The use of the EUCs by both Canada and the US is trade-distorting  as EUCs increase
transaction costs through additional administration  and separate transport  and storage for at
least part of the journey from exporter to end-user.  Even in their least trade encumbering
manifestation,  that is, when they are used simply for tracking foreign wheat flows, EUCs must
be completed  either by the exporter or the importer prior to the commodity's introduction
into the trade of the other state. The end-use certificate  system undeniably  increases handling
and reporting requirements  on imported  wheat.  They may  also restrict the way  in which
imported wheat can be used.
Arguably, the Canadian treatment of American wheat coming into Canada  is more trade-
distorting than the American regime for Canadian wheat for five reasons. First, there exists
four different  regimes  depending  on the  use of the American  wheat  under Canadian  law.
Under American legislation, there is only one instrument, the EUC. In Canada, wheat for seed
needs a seed certificate,  wheat for re-export requires in bond treatment under the Customs
Act,  wheat for direct  animal  consumption must be  denatured by  red dye,  and wheat for
3°Under proposed changes to the Regulations,  this form will be renumbered to CFSA-751.
For proposed changes, see supra, note 31.
31Options  listed  include  milling  for  animal  feed,  milling  for  human  consumption,
manufacturing, brewing  or malting, distilling, export or other.
170processing  requires an EUC.  Second,  under the Canadian regime, it is almost impossible to
redesignate the end-use of imported wheat. If the wheat enters to be milled it cannot be re-
exported. In fact, the penalties for redesignation  are so draconian, that one would not even
contemplate re-exporting the wheat into the US.  Once the use and the facility are named,
there appears  to be no turning back under the Canadian  scheme.  Third,  while feed wheat
flows from Canada to the US require more paper work (EUC) than from the US to Canada,
more expense will likely be incurred  in US-to-Canada  feed wheat flows because of the cost
of denaturing even though no EUC is required.  Fourth, under Canadian law, there is a high
possibility that the EUC could act as a border barrier because the EUC must be presented to
a Customs Officer rather than simply being sent to a government  agency within  15  days of the
importation  of the  wheat  as  is  the  case  under  US  Law.  Finally,  Canada's  regulatory
framework establishing the EUC regime is less transparent and more  complex, legislatively
speaking,  with at least three  separate  Acts and three sets of regulations in  play, than that
setting up the US  regime.  It also appears  that in the very near future,  reporting under the
American system will be more efficient than under the Canadian one, given that the American
scheme will permit reporting by mail,  fax or electronic transmission.32
Are there legislative alternatives? EUCs would not be necessary if the Canada-US  trading
area was a true free trade area.  This would mean,  of course, that grading  schemes would have
to  be  harmonized  and  farm  support  not  be  based  on  production  or  export  quantities.
International  trading rules,  such as those under the GATT  1994,  are  inching towards this
reality. But prospects of a harmonious integration of two radically different  grading systems,
marketing schemes,  and underlying philosophies in the two countries makes the prospect of
the disappearance of EUCs  and free trade in grains unlikely in the near future.
For the moment it appears that EUCs for wheat are here to stay. However, improvements
could be made to make EUCs less trade-distorting.  Canada needs to streamline and simplify
its system. One instrument should be adopted for all American wheat imports no matter what
the intended use.  That instrument (probably the EUC works  as well as any) should require
the importer to designate the end-use  of the wheat but should permit the redirection of such
wheat on application  to the Canadian Wheat Board. If flows from the US through Canada
became  significant,  the CWB  could  refuse  such redirection.  Until that  situation  occurs,  a
subsequent buyer or end user could change the intended end use to allow for a more optimal,
market-driven  end use.
On a more radical note, perhaps  Canada and the US  should consider the elimination of
the EUC and simply require importers to file a copy of the bill of lading with an appropriate
government  authority.  Such a  scheme  would  be  cheaper,  more  efficient,  and  less trade-
distorting while still permitting the two countries to monitor volumes and end-use destinations
of the neighbor's wheat in each domestic market. As we explore in the next sections, maybe
there are other reasons why the two countries are not yet ready to move to this radical option.
32For proposed changes,  see supra, note 31.
171The Effects  of EUCs on Market Arbitrage
The rationale for the Canadian use of EUCs appears quite straight forward.  In Canada,
wheat is graded by visual inspection.  Wheat varieties grown in Canada are selected for the
characteristics that allow visual grading.  For example Canadian Western Red  Spring Wheat
varieties can be distinguished from soft varieties by visual inspection.  In addition, with these
varieties, the bread making properties can be largely be determined by visual characteristics;
i.e.,  a  sample  of these  varieties  that  have  "good"  visual  characteristics  will  also  have
corresponding milling characteristics.  Allowing US varieties  in the marketing channel  that
do not have visual distinguishability would require either a complete change in the Canadian
grading system or would result in a reduction in the reliability of the existing grading system.
Given  the  reputation  Canada  has  earned  for  consistent  product  quality,  preventing  the
potential introduction of US wheat varieties in the marketing system may be a legitimate use
of an ATB that requires the use of EUCs.
Although  clearly  more  legally  restrictive  than the  US  requirements,  Canadian  EUCs
probably have very little impact on trade because of natural arbitrage opportunities for wheat
flows from the US to Canada rather than in the other direction. 33  The  CWB has  an explicit
policy to sell to domestic millers at a price equal to or less than the landed price of equivalent
US grain.  As a result, wheat imports from the US have been limited to very small volumes,
and restricted to times when there is a shortage of specific  qualities of Canadian wheat.  The
effects of EUCs would be limited to these circumstances.
The  imposition of US  EUCs  has  a far greater  impact  on trade  given that  profitable
arbitrage opportunities have existed.  First, the requirement  creates a paper trail that allows
easy  enforcement  of the  US  laws that  restrict  the  re-export  of Canadian  wheat.  This
effectively  eliminates the possibility that Canadian wheat  is re-exported under  the Export
Enhancement Program [EEP].  Given that such re-export would involve significant  cost, there
is an economic justification for such a move.  Second, the EUCs are clearly a form of an ATB
that increases the transaction cost of importing Canadian wheat into the US for the purposes
of domestic  consumption.  This impact will be  differential  depending  on the size  and  the
frequency  of transaction.  For large,  repetitive  transactions  this  provision will  be  almost
costless.  For smaller volume transactions that would utilize the US grain handling system,
the  requirement  for  separate  storage  and  transport  may  increase  the  cost  per  tonne
considerably.  From a political point of view, this could be considered  a gesture to placate
those  seeking  protection for US producers  in the  domestic  market.  Third,  EUCs  allow
Canadian authorities to determine whether Canadian wheat is being sold into the feed or the
milling wheat market.
This  third result,  a most interesting  effect,  is  almost  surely unintentional.  Producers
wishing to sell export milling wheat to the US  can do so only after taking their grain to a
primary elevator to have it weighed.  The producer would, in effect, deliver the grain to the
33Furtan, Hartley,  Richard  Gray and  Alvin Ulrich, "Canadian Wheat  Board Value  Added
Enhancement Study,"  prepared for the CWB, June  1994.
172CWB  and receive the initial payment  and would have to buy it back from the CWB  at the
"buy-back"  price.  The buy-back  price  is  set by formula  by the CWB  and  is  equal to  the
Minneapolis  price minus transport.  Thus a producer can only profit from the transaction  if
he/she can receive a price greater than the US commercial price.  As  a result, few producers
were taking advantage  of this provision.  However, "feed" grains (or milling wheat graded
as feed) can be sold outside of the CWB pooling.  As such, feed grades of wheat are exempt
from  the  buy-back  requirement.  Canadian  producers  could  evade  the  CWB  buy-back
provisions for milling wheat by having the grain assigned  a grade of feed.34 In this case they
could capture  any premiums that exist in the US market.  The EUC  requirement makes  it
easier  to  determine  whether  the  grain  is  destined  for  the  milling  or  feed  market.  This
information  could  potentially  identify  those Canadian  producers  and  elevator  agents  that
engage in the activity of avoiding CWB buy-back provisions by declaring the grain  as feed
grade.
In a competitive framework,  introducing ATBs will reduce welfare  by restricting arbitrage
opportunities.  The same does not necessarily follow when the market is distorted.  In terms
of the Canada-US  wheat trade,  two  polices that  clearly distort trade  are the EEP  and  the
CWB  monopoly  powers.  The  presence  of these  distortions  could  affect  the  welfare
implications of the EUCs.
Preventing the  re-export  of Canadian  wheat  from the  US  under the EEP program  is
essential for the program's effective operation.  The US government  uses an export bonus to
drive a wedge between the price in the commercial markets, which includes the US domestic
market,  and the  non-commercial  or "dumping"  markets.  This allows the US producers to
capture  some benefit from the  export subsidy plus  some additional benefit  from the price
discrimination.  The  ability of the US to maintain a higher domestic price than the average
price  received  on  the world  markets  is  dependent  upon  imperfect  substitution  between
Canadian and US wheat in the domestic market.  In addition,  it is dependent  on the ability of
the US to block the re-export  of Canadian grain to world markets.  Otherwise, it would be
in the best interest of the CWB to ship to dumping markets via US markets where the product
would receive the dumping price for Canadian wheat plus the EEP bonus.  Clearly, this would
be to the advantage of the CWB and to the disadvantage of US taxpayers.
Limiting the non CWB sales to the US will also have effects on the market.  Consider first
the case where only the CWB may  sell wheat into the US.  The CWB may choose to restrict
supplies to the US to maintain a price in the US market above the Canadian price in order to
maximize the return for Canadian  producers. If milling wheat  and durum producers  could
arbitrage  the price  difference  freely this would  reduce the monopoly power of the CWB,
thereby reducing the aggregate returns to Canadian producers. There is also a possibility that
this arbitrage could work against the interest of US producers and taxpayers as more wheat
gets sold into the US market.
34In the Canadian grading  system the grade of the grain is arrived at by mutual agreement  of
the primary elevator operator  and the producer.  It is only in the case of an agreed dispute
that the sample is sent to the Canadian grain Commission for an official and binding grade.
173The  Welfare and Trade Consequences of Constrained  Arbitrage
The EUCs alter market conditions and trade.  In order to evaluate the economic impacts
to the EUCs, we utilize the model developed by Alston, Gray and Sumner [AGS]. 35  This
model is sophisticated enough to capture the effect of third country trade while being simple
enough to examine the effects of interest to us.
The AGS model has three regions:  Canada, the US, and an aggregate  representing the rest
of the world [ROW].  The supply and demand equations are represented by functions that are
linear  in  prices  and quantities  over the range of the changes  being  analyzed.  Wheat  is a
heterogeneous  group  of commodities  which  must be  treated  as  distinct.  The  wheats  of
different  classes are  segregated  according to their end-use characteristics  into three types:
Durum,  other Milling and Feed.  Supply is linked among types within a region, but there is
no appreciable  substitution in consumption  among these three categories.
In any region, the supply of each type of wheat depends on the producer prices of milling,
durum,  and feed wheat.  Feed wheat  supply is treated  as  an after-the-fact  result from the
production  of durum or milling wheat. The ROW price of feed wheat is exogenous.  On the
demand  side,  different  types  of wheat  (i.e.,  durum,  milling  and  feed)  are  consumed
independently,  regardless  of their  regional source.  Wheats  of the same type from different
regions are treated as differentiated goods due to differences in wheat quality per se among
regions,  or discrimination  by buyers among  source regions  on other grounds.  Armington
assumptions36 are used to define the matrix of own- and cross-price  elasticities of demand in
each of the three regions in the model.  Canada exports all three types of wheat to the ROW
and to the US; the US exports milling and durum (but not feed) wheat to the ROW; the ROW
exports durum,  in the form of pasta, to the US; and, the US exports nothing to Canada.
For simplicity, we treat the US EEP policy as a pure average per unit export subsidy of
$40 per tonne for each wheat type (durum or milling wheat) to the ROW.  In the results here,
the  export  subsidy  is  fixed  exogenously  and  does not  respond  when  alternative  import
quantities  are  derived  in the model.  The US  farm program  for wheat  operates  over the
horizon considered  as essentially a de-coupled payment, the amount of which depends on the
US weighted average price for wheat across types relative to the overall target price applied
to the product of program yield and eligible program acreage. Deficiency  payments are based
on program acreage and program yields that do not depend on actual production.  However,
the overall cost does depend on the overall average  market price relative to the target price,
the  difference  between  which  becomes  the  per  unit  deficiency  payment  which  applies
effectively to the fixed program quantity.
35Alston,  Julian  M.,  Richard  Gray,  and  Daniel  A.  Sumner,  "The  Wheat  War  of 1994,"
Canadian  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics 42:  pp. 231-251.
36Armington assumptions  imply that product from different countries are substituted for one
another with a common elasticity of substitution.
Armington, P.S. (1969).  "A Theory of Product Differentiation for Products Distinguished
by Place of Production,"  IMF Staff Papers.
174Finally, we treat the CWB as exercising monopoly control  over the allocation of Canadian
wheat  to produce the maximum  revenue  for producers.  The  market  clearing  conditions
reflect total utilization of the product, US price policy rules,  and  arbitrage conditions.  For
a given type of wheat from a given source,  differences in prices among consuming regions,
and between producers  and consumers in the region where it is produced,  are wedges due to
pricing policies.  For a given type of wheat  (e.g.,  durum),  differences in prices for the same
type from different  producing  regions might be  due to quality  differences  as well  as price
wedges.
Simulating the ConstrainedArbitrage
Base Case:  The Status Quo
As a point of comparison, we use the AGS model to simulate the market with restricted
arbitrage.  The 1994-95 crop year is used as the basis of simulation. It is assumed in this case
that Canadian wheat is not re-exported under the EEP and that the CWB controls the export
of all wheat.  In this situation, we assume the CWB is not restricted in the level of export to
the US and sells an amount of milling wheat,  durum wheat and feed wheat into each market
which maximizes  Canadian producer revenue.  As can be seen in Table 2,  Canada exports
0.795  Mt of durum  and  1.684 Mt of milling wheat to the US with  $3.34 billion  in wheat
revenue.  The US government spends $1.60 billion on deficiency payments  and $1.31  billion
on EEP  bonus assumed to be $40 per tonne exported.
Table 2.  Simulation  results for Canadian-US wheat trade, 1995-95
Quantity or Price  BASE'  Case  12  Case 23   Case  34
US  Imports  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000  tons)  ('000 tons)
Feed  Wheat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Milling Wheat  1684.96  2717.28  1704.07  2585.26
Durum  Wheat  794.89  1286.32  805.76  1304.02
Dunru  m Pasta  117.97  40.94  151.16  40.79
US  Production  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Feed Wheat  6525.56  6513.34  6531.84  6514.29
Milling Wheat  57158.89  57101.70  57191.95  57111.67
Durum Wheat  2142.17  2088.26  2166.13  2086.93
US Exports  ('000 tons)  ('000  tons)  ('000  tons)  ('000  tons)
Feed  Wheat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Milling  Wheat  31231.38  32184.90  31294.69  32062.34
Durum  Wheat  1495.70  1842.51  1569.62  1858.70
175Table 2  continued
US  Mkt. Price  ($/ton)  ($/ton)  ($/ton)  ($/ton)
Feed Wheat  103.05  103.06  103.05  103.06
Milling Wheat  $132.162  $131.949  $132.276  $131.972
Durum  Wheat  $145.590  $143.466  $146.545  $143.430
Average  Wheat  Price  $3.146  $3.139  $3.150  $3.140
Deficiency  Pay/bu.  $0.854  $0.861  $0.850  $0.860
US  Gov't Outlays  millions  millions  millions  millions
Wheat Def. Payments  $1,601  $1,615  $1,595  $1,614
Chg. Def. Payments  $0  $13  ($7)  $12
EEP  $1,309  $1,361  $1,315  $1,357
Change  in  EEP  $0  $52  $5  $48
Total Change in  $0.00  $65.39  ($1.36)  $60.19
Government Outlay
Canadian Production  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Durum  Wheat  3554.28  3494.19  3564.84  3511.91
Milling Wheat  23155.73  23098.21  23174.44  22966.12
Feed  Wheat  2879.52  2866.84  2882.67  2854.51
Canadian-US Exports  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Durum Wheat  794.89  1286.32  586.50  1284.69
Milling Wheat  1684.96  2717.28  1159.58  2788.77
Feed Wheat  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Canadian-ROW Exports  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)
Durum Wheat  2433.94  1881.71  2653.20  1901.05
Milling Wheat  15543.23  14452.64  16087.73  14249.14
Feed  Wheat  645.61  632.98  648.75  620.64
Canadian Pooled Price  ($/t)  ($/t)  ($/t)  ($/t)
Durum  Wheat  $116.91  $114.10  $117.45  $114.13
Milling Wheat  $113.66  $112.75  $113.91  $111.48
Feed  Wheat  $103.92  $103.93  $103.92  $103.93
Average  wheat  price  $113.10  $112.05  $113.36  $111.06
Producer Revenue  millions  millions  millions  millions
Gross Revenue  $3,346.65  $3,300.93  $3,358.03  $3,257.80
Change in producer  $0.00  ($30.95)  $7.68  ($60.01)
surplus
CWB controls exports, no re-export of Canadian wheat under EEP.
2Canadian producers have direct access to US markets.
3CWB controls exports, re-exports  of Canadian wheat under EEP  are allowed.
4Canadian producers have direct access to US markets, re-exports of Canadian wheat under EEP are allowed.
176Case  1: Allowing Export of Canadian Wheat to the US beyond CWB Control
The  second  column  of Table  2  represents  the  results  of the  simulation  under  the
assumption that Canadian milling wheat producers and durum producers have direct access
to the US  market  and  would export to  the US  as  long  as the  US  price was  above  the
Canadian pooled price for these wheats.  In this case, it was assumed that the equilibrium
fo.b. price for Canadian wheat in the US was no greater than the pooled price for producers
in Canada.  In this situation, exports to the US increased well beyond the revenue  maximizing
level  to 1.29 Mt for durum and 2.72 Mt for milling wheat.  As could be expected, this surge
in exports resulted in an increase  in deficiency payments by $13.4  million and an increase  in
EEP costs by $52 million.  More surprisingly, if removal of the EUC resulted in free flow of
grain to the US,  Canadian producer surplus would be reduced by $31.0 million.  Thus the
EUC clearly acts in Canadian producer interests.
Case 2:  Allowing Re-Export of Canadian Wheat
In this simulation,  we assume the only effect of removal of the EUC  would be the re-
export  of Canadian  grain under  the  EEP  program.  Specifically,  the  simulation  allows
additional Canadian wheat to be re-exported to the ROW via the US and to receive the $40
per tonne EEP bonus in the process.  Of the $40 per tonne bonus, it is assumed the CWB  can
net $20 per tonne because of the more circuitous route it must follow. Canadian producer
surplus increases by $7.68 million over the base scenario.  What is surprising is that,  despite
the gain of Canadian producers,  the US government  (and US producers) are virtually in the
same position.  The EEP cost increases by $5.4 million and deficiency  cost are reduced by
$6.8 million.  This result is produced because the re-export of additional tonnage increases
the amount of price discrimination  in the market.  For instance,  the price  spread between
Canadian durum in the US and in the ROW market  increases from $27 per tonne to $36 per
tonne, which is closer to the US spread the EEP bonus of $40 per tonne.  Thus,  if the CWB
believed removal of EUCs would allow them to continue to act as a monopoly into the US
market but would  also  allow the re-export  of Canadian  wheat,  they would  be in favor  of
removing EUCs.
Case 3:  Combined Effect
In this simulation, we allow the direct shipment of wheat to the US and the re-export of
Canadian wheat to the ROW.  However, both the US government and Canadian producers
are worse  off  Canadian  exports to the US increase to  1.3  Mt and  2.8 Mt for durum  and
milling wheat  respectively.  However,  lower prices  in all  markets  result  in  a reduction in
Canadian producer surplus by $60 million.  The US government costs increase by $12  million
for deficiency payments and $47 million for EEP bonuses.  Thus it is clear that both countries
may have  an interest in preventing these forms of arbitrage given the EEP  and the CWB
monopoly.
Simulations  for Case  1 and Case 3  suggest  that if the US EUCs  allow the CWB to
maintain monopoly control over Canadian wheat exports, a substantial benefit for Canadian
producers would result.  These  same  simulations  indicate  that enforcement  of the CWB
177monopoly also reduces US government costs.  Somewhat ironically,  as shown in Case 2, if
the only effect of the certificates is to prevent the re-export  of Canadian wheat,  this is of no
benefit for the US taxpayer.  Thus gains for the US taxpayer from EUCs will only occur if
they facilitate  the enforcement  of the CWB monopoly, which happens to be consistent with
Canadian producer interests.
Summary and Conclusions
Recently,  both Canada and the US have introduced EUCs after a long history of trade
disputes  in wheat.  While the Canadian  requirements are more  stringent and  commercially
more difficult to meet, the US requirements  have a larger impact on trade.  In the recent past,
there has been an incentive to export from Canada to the US, either to capture US markets
not filled by US wheat, or to take advantage of EEP bonuses with the re-export of Canadian
wheat from the US to the ROW.  With respect to the latter, the US EUCs affect this arbitrage
opportunity by enforcing the CWB monopoly on wheat  exports and  by preventing  the re-
export of Canadian wheat. The results of the simulation show that enforcement of the CWB
monopoly  has  a  positive  impact  on  both the  pooled  revenue  of producers  and  the  US
government's costs.  Ironically,  if  the only effect of the certificates  is to prevent re-export, the
EUCs cause a slight increase in farm program costs.
A review of the legal regime instituting EUCs indicates that the Canadian requirements
are  more  complex  and  commercially  difficult  to  meet  than  those  in  the  US.  Simple
modifications of the existing legislative framework would expedite trade while maintaining
product separation.
The results of the simulations indicate that,  in distorted markets,  ATBs in the form of
EUCs can improve welfare.  In particular, the existence of the EEP means the US may benefit
from  this form  of protectionism.  The  results  also  indicate  that the  US  can benefit  from
maintaining the CWB monopoly over grain exports.  This is particularly interesting  given US
groups  are lobbing very hard to reduce CWB powers in the US and other markets.
Further  Research
In a general sense the effects of ATBs may be very difficult to predict when markets  are
distorted.  From  our case  study, it is clearly in the interest of the CWB to have the EUCs
enforce their monopoly.  This may also  hold true for large multinational  corporations  that
wish to practice price discrimination internationally.  For instance, it may be in the interest of
herbicide  companies  or pharmaceutical  companies to have ATBs  put in place to prevent
arbitrage between countries at anything beyond the active ingredient level.  In these situations
where sectors of the exporting country are not opposed to ATBs, then they may be far more
likely to  exist.  More  work  is  needed  to  study  the  effects  of ATBs with  multinational
production of differentiated products.
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